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ADMISSIBILITY OF WRITTEN STANDARDS AS
EVIDENCE OF THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS IN VIRGINIA
Gwen M. Schockemoehl*
I. INTRODUCTION
The standard of care in a medical negligence action represents
the duty which the defendant physician, nurse, hospital or other
health care provider owes to the patient. In Virginia, it is that de-
gree of care and skill possessed by the reasonably prudent practi-
tioner of the same specialty in this state.' This standard is an elu-
sive one at best. While learned treatises and journal articles assist
in determining the standard, in practice the plaintiff offers experts
who state, based on their knowledge, training, and experience that
the standard of care requires the defendant to provide a particular
type of care which the defendant did not provide. The defendant
in turn, offers experts with similar knowledge, training and experi-
ence who testify that the standard required a different type of
care, which the defendant did in fact provide. The trial becomes a
"battle of the experts," a contest where each side attempts to ob-
tain a greater number of more attractive and more convincing
experts.
This article discusses an alternative which, while not eliminating
the need for expert testimony, will eliminate some of the elusive-
ness surrounding the standard of care concept. Such an alternative
is to allow as evidence written health care standards promulgated
under the auspices of (1) national certifying or accrediting organi-
zations such as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hos-
pitals, (2) federal law, (3) state licensing and regulatory boards and
(4) individual health care institutions. In addition to aiding the
trier of fact, these standards are relevant, material and not subject
to any persuasive objections. This article assesses and promotes
the admission of written health care standards based on an analy-
* Partner, Taylor & Schockemoehl, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1967, Vassar; M.S.W.,
1969, Smith College School of Social Work; J.D., 1982, T.C. Williams School of Law, Univer-
sity of Richmond.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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sis of the modern trend towards admitting written standards; the
various types of standards and their relationship to federal and
state law applicable to health care providers; the Virginia cases
which have discussed the admission of various non-health care
written standards; and the procedures for implementing the admis-
sion of such standards during discovery and at trial.
I. SEMINAL CASES: EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM IN THE TRADE
According to some writers, in the past, the majority rule pre-
cluded the admission of codes or standards which did not have the
force and effect of law as evidence of negligence per se.' Frequently
such standards were viewed as hearsay opinions about developing
sciences.' Those who sought to introduce them attempted to apply
one of the evidentiary exceptions to the hearsay rule such as the
public record or learned treatise exception in order to obtain their
admission. Standards not found in statutes or administrative regu-
lations generally do not have the force of law. This includes stan-
dards promulgated by either governmental bodies or voluntary as-
sociations. Of these, standards promulgated by voluntary
associations are more likely to be admitted into evidence.4 The
modern trend is to admit all types of written standards, along with
other evidence, to illustrate the standard of care required of the
defendant in a negligence case.'
Two cases are frequently cited for the proposition that written
standards should be admitted as evidence. The first is the 1964
case of McComish v. DeSoi,6 a products liability case involving an
industrial injury where the plaintiff administratrix sued the com-
panies responsible for building, reassembling and installing the
machine which caused the decedent's injuries. Following a verdict
2. S. BALDWIN, F. HARE, JR. & F. McGOVERN, THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCT LIABILITY
CASE § 3.3.2 (1981); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 273 (1971).
3. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1003 (1967).
4. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 891 (1967).
5. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians and Surgeons § 344 (1981); Yacura, Inside the
PDR, 20 TRIAL June 1984, at 64 (discussing the use of drug "inserts" or similar literature
which is reproduced in the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR) as evidence of the standard
of care in drug therapy cases, particularly when the written standards apply to a doctor's
duty to warn)- see also Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litiga-
tion, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1965) (dealing with the use of non-medical standards at trial
by plaintiffs and defendants in products liability and personal injury cases); Comment, Ad-
missibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REv.
581 (1970) (discussing the admissibility of safety codes and standards in negligence cases).
6. 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964).
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for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed, alleging that the court
erred in admitting industry safety standards regarding the con-
struction of the machine involved. The court, ruling for the plain-
tiff, held that the standards were not learned treatises and conse-
quently were not hearsay opinion of one expert,7 excludable as an
out-of-court statement not subject to cross examination. Under
this decision, treatises are properly used only for impeachment
purposes when a witness has recognized a particular treatise as au-
thoritative." The McComish court ruled that the standards were
not hearsay, but rather were admissible evidence as to the common
practice and matured judgment of those with experience in a par-
ticular business.9
7. But cf. FED. R. EvID. 803 (18) (Learned treatises may be read into evidence, although
not admitted as an exhibit, if they are acknowledged by the expert witness upon cross exam-
ination or relied upon him in direct examination.).
8. McComish, 42 N.J. at -, 200 A.2d at 120.
9. Id. at -, 200 A.2d at 121-22; see also C & M Promotions v. Ryland, 208 Va. 365, 158
S.E.2d 132 (1967) in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that general usage of the business in a given
situation is admissible as evidence of what is reasonable and proper to be done in
that situation, from which, along with other (if there be other) pertinent facts and
circumstances, the jury are [sic] to determine the question of negligence. If there is
no conflict in the evidence as to the existence of general usage, and nothing tending
to show that the usage was not reasonably safe or adequate for its purpose and occa-
sion, such usage is conclusive evidence of the exercise of ordinary care.
Id. at 368, 158 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Andrews v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 192 Va. 150,
157, 63 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1951)).
Although there have been no written opinions issued by the Virginia Supreme Court on
the admissibility of written standards, Judge Willard I. Walker ruled, in a Richmond Circuit
Court case involving an injury caused by a radial arm saw, that the Occupational Safety and
Health Association (OSHA) standards requiring a machine guard were admissible. Usher v.
Forcade, No. LG-423. Richmond Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 1984) (A shop class instructor was alleg-
edly negligent for not ensuring that the saw was in proper condition before it was used by
students. During the instructor's deposition, he acknowledged that he was familiar with the
OSHA standards and had allegedly complied with them.).
In some cases, professional standards should be admissible in negligence actions. For ex-
ample, in actions brought against attorneys the Code of Professional Responsibility should
be admissible to indicate a code violation which might constitute breach of a voluntarily
assumed duty. But cf. Ortis v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 131, 278 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1981) (a
negligence action against an attorney wherein DR 5-107(B) was held inadmissible on the
grounds of relevancy); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1085-86, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1980) (a
negligence action brought against an attorney wherein the Court held that the code provi-
sion created neither a private cause of action nor a remedy available to non-clients).
The reasoning behind the admissibility of all written codes is expressed in Burley v. Loui-
siana Power and Light Co., 319 So. 2d 334, 338 (La. 1975) (Although a code or regulation
may not have been adopted by law or ordinance or supported by expert testimony, it is still
produced by the combined effort of groups having special knowledge of the subject matter
and every reason to adopt wise standards for general safety.).
A New Jersey medical negligence case which prohibited the admission of American Acad-
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The second landmark case, decided one year after McComish, is
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.0 Darling
provides an in-depth analysis of the use of health care standards in
a medical and hospital negligence action. The case involved an ap-
peal from a verdict in which the defendant alleged error in the ad-
mission of the state's licensing regulations for hospitals, the defen-
dant hospital's bylaws, and the national standards for hospital
accreditation.1 The court held that all of these standards were ad-
missible as evidence of custom, because a hospital, in reality, "as-
sumes certain responsibilities for the care of the patient" which are
separate and distinct from the responsibilities of its individual
staff personnel.' 2 The court decided that the standards would aid
emy of Pediatrics Standards supports the proposition that medical standards are different
from other safety °standards and should be treated differently by the courts. Swank v.
Halivopoulos, 108 N.J. Super. 120, 260 A.2d 240 (1969). The pediatrics standards involved
in Swank contained no specific requirements, but rather general recommendations or guide-
lines. However the court noted that the standard sought to be introduced against the defen-
dant had been complied with and that other written standards containing the same informa-
tion had already been admitted without objection. Id. at -, 260 A.2d at 243. The court's
ruling implies that if the plaintiff had sought to admit a standard which had not been com-
plied with or which had not already been admitted in another form, the result may have
been different. See also Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 148, § 10 (1964) (discussing Swank as well as
the use of governmental and voluntary association codes applicable to other types of per-
sonal injury cases. Such cases involve electrical lines, industrial power equipment, airplanes,
vehicles, recreational activities, fires and architectural designs.). For a discussion of the ad-
missibility of codes or rules promulgated by the defendant in personal injury cases involving
vehicles, explosives, premises or defective products see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 16 (1956). The
key to admissibility of these rules is expressed in Current v. Columbia Gas Inc., 383 S.W.2d
139 (Ky. 1964). The court developed the following criteria for admissibility of rules: The
rules must be effective before and at pertinent periods involved, known to employees, rele-
vant to the case and created for safety purposes, and there must be no showing that the
rules go beyond the standard of ordinary care. Id. at 143.
10. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), aff'g 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964).
11. These national standards are now commonly referred to as JCAH standards, pub-
lished yearly by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) to reflect
changes in the state of the art. The standards relate to the quality of care in services pro-
vided. Compliance with standards has been demonstrated at an existing hospital and is
measurable. Standards are created because a need exists to measure and improve care in a
particular area. At present there are written standards for the following areas: anesthesia
services, dietetic services, emergency services, functional safety and sanitation, governing
body, home care services, hospital sponsored ambulatory care services, infection control,
management and administrative services, medical record services, medical staff, nursing ser-
vices, pathology and medical laboratory services, pharmaceutical services, professional li-
brary services, quality assurance, radiology services, rehabilitation programs/services, respir-
atory care services, social work services, special care units, and utilization review. JOINT
COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, (1983)
[hereinafter cited as JCAH STANDARDS]. See also S. E. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, 1 ArEmi-
CAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 3:4 -:38 (1980).
12. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at -, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
728
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the jury in deciding what the hospital feasibly knew or should have
known about its responsibilities for the care of patients."
When the Darling case was decided, the national standards for
hospital accreditation were labeled by the drafters as "required
minimum" standards. The following year the same national stan-
dards for hospitals held admissible in Darling were amended to
reflect hospitals' desire to change the standards from a "required
minimum" to those viewed as "optimal."' 4 This view has continued
to the present. The 1983 version of these standards include as their
stated purpose the encouragement of "hospitals to strive for excel-
lence in the provision of patient care.' 5 These standards currently
appear in the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals which is pub-
lished yearly by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH) and reflect changes in applicable standards.
Since JCAH standards are now "optimal," it is argued that they
are not reliable indicators of custom in the industry. 6 The better
view, however, is that the standards continue to reflect generally
recognized healthcare standards. For example, in Cornfeldt v.
13. Other cases, like Darling, which have held that written standards are admissible as
evidence to show whether the standard of care was violated include: Steeves v. United
States, 294 F. Supp. 446, 454-55 (D.S.C. 1968) (Federal Tort Claims negligence action alleg-
ing that physicians did not obtain necessary consultation was supported by American Medi-
cal Association and JCAH Standards as well as hospital regulations); Fox v. Cohgen, 84 Ill.
App. 3d 744, 750, 406 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1980) (A wrongful death action against the physician
for medical negligence and against hospital and its employees for destruction or loss of med-
ical records wherein the court admitted evidence as to the hospital's duty to keep records.
This duty was established by a statement of the American Hospital Association's Commit-
tee on Medical Records, by the American Medical Record Association's Planning and By-
laws Committee, and by the JCAH standards, which provide that one of the purposes of a
medical record is to "assist in protecting the legal interests of the patient, hospital and
responsible practitioners."); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,
-, 349 A.2d 245, 254 (1975) (a negligence case where the JCAH standards for hospital
accreditation were admitted on the issue of the hospital's negligence, and where other writ-
ten standards, applicable to practitioners in all states, were admitted on the issue of the
physician's negligence); Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Found., 179 Mont. 305, 588 P.2d
493, 502, 503-04 (1978) (negligence case brought against the hospital and physicians wherein
the court held that the plaintiff's expert witness should have been allowed to testify as to
the hospital's violation of its own rules since such testimony was within the scope of "scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge which would aid the trier of fact").
14. JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at ix.
15. Id. at x.
16. An additional objection to the use of standards is based on policy considerations. For
example, if a health care provider is to be judged by a policy which reflects an optimal
standard, then those providers will cease to write or aspire to standards of excellence since
those written policies may constitute a duty. This potential problem, however, is remedied
through the introduction of other persuasive evidence indicative of what the standard of
care is and through appropriate jury instructions. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Tongen,17 a medical negligence action involving a claim of wrongful
death, the court held that the JCAH standards were relevant and
material as evidence of accepted medical practice. 8 Once the evi-
dence indicated that the JCAH standards had been adopted by the
hospital where the patient was being treated, 9 the standards were
declared admissible. The court acted even though the defendants
lacked familiarity with the standards, and despite the fact that the
standards were national in character, whereas the state subscribed
to a local standard.
There are two clear policy reasons for admitting JCAH stan-
dards into evidence regarding the standard of care. First, compli-
ance with JCAH standards has, in prior years, formed the basis for
hospital accreditation. 20 The reality of the 1980's is that hospitals
almost without exception 21 adopt JCAH standards. Hospitals also
use the standards as the basis for their own internal manuals. Sec-
ond, health care providers adopt these standards as the required
price for doing business in the health care field. Due to an overrid-
ing and legitimate concern for the public welfare and in exchange
for payment of a significant percentage of patient bills, the federal
17. 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977).
18. Id. at 704.
19. Id. at 703-04.
20. The stated purposes of the JCAH Standards are:
1. to establish standards for the operation of hospitals and other health-related
facilities and services;
2. to conduct survey and accreditation programs that will encourage members of
the health professions, hospitals, and other health-related facilities and services
voluntarily:
a. to promote high quality of care in all aspects in order to give patients the
optimum benefits that medical science has to offer,
b. to apply certain basic principles of physical plant safety and maintenance, and
of organization and administration of function for efficient care of the patient, and
c. to maintain the essential services in the facilities through coordinated effort of
the organized staffs and the governing bodies of the facilities;
3. to recognize compliance with standards by issuance of certificates of
accreditation;
4. to conduct programs of education and research and publish the results thereof,
which will further the other purposes of the corporation, and to accept grants, gifts,
bequests, and devices in support of the purposes of the corporation; and
5. to assume such other responsibilities and to conduct such other activities as are
compatible with the operation of such standard-setting, survey and accreditation
programs.
JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at ix (emphasis added).
21. Ninety-nine of the 108 general hospitals in Virginia are accredited. Div. of Medical
and Nursing Facilities Services, Va. Dep't of Health, Health Care Facilities Licensing and
Certification Activities Monthly Report 4 (May 31, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Monthly
Report].
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and state governments regulate the business of health care by
utilizing these standards.
III. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN
VIRGINIA AND GOVERNMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
A. National Standards
1. The JCAH Standards
Accredited hospitals, which include almost all Virginia hospitals,
must comply with mandatory JCAH standards. These standards
apply to hospital departments regardless of their status as inde-
pendent contractors or employees. A review of the JCAH stan-
dards reveals that each separate section contains principles, stan-
dards, and interpretations of those standards.2 Although the
methods used to implement the standards may vary from hospital
to hospital, the standards do apply to all accredited hospitals and
substantial compliance is expected. 3 To illustrate the relevance
and materiality of a typical standard, consider the following exam-
ple. Assume that a patient-plaintiff has alleged an injury that was
caused by the failure of the Emergency Department to perform a
procedure described in and required by the applicable written
standards. In such a case, both the general standard requiring writ-
ten procedures and the specific standard describing the procedure
would be relevant. The defendant would naturally seek to intro-
duce the standards if they had complied with them, and the plain-
tiff would want to introduce the standards if there had been a fail-
ure to comply. The assigned weight given to compliance or non-
compliance with a particular standard would be affected by the
mandatory or non-mandatory language of the standard. It should
be noted that the word "shall" is used by the JCAH to indicate a
mandatory standard.
The general JCAH standard24 applicable to this emergency de-
22. JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11.
23. Id. at xi-xii. The specific language used in the JCAH standards defines certain
mandatory requirements. For example, the term shall or must is used to indicate a
mandatory statement, the only acceptable method under the current standards. The term
should is used in interpretation of a standard to reflect the commonly accepted method, yet
it allows for the use of effective alternatives. The term may is used in the interpretation of a
standard to reflect an acceptable method that is recognized but not necessarily preferred.
Id. at 209, 211.
24. The standard is that "[e]mergency patient care shall be guided by written policies
and procedures." The interpretation of the standard is as follows:
1984]
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partment hypothetical provides that written policies are required
for hospital emergency services pertaining to the conduct of pa-
tient care and that those policies must be enforced. This particular
standard is clearly neither optimal nor optional. Therefore, assum-
ing that this standard is relevant to the patient's injury, evidence
that a defendant either complied or did not comply with this
mandatory standard would be significant.
As previously noted, in order to obtain accreditation status, hos-
pitals must conform to JCAH standards.2" Conformity is main-
tained by inspections and related survey reports conducted at the
initial application for certification as well as every three years
thereafter.2 6 Accreditation by JCAH not only enables a hospital to
attract patients by advertising its accredited status, but also en-
ables most hospitals to obtain government funding through Medi-
care and Medicaid. Evidence of compliance with JCAH standards
also enables some Virginia hospitals to secure up to twenty percent
reductions in medical malpractice insurance premiums.28
2. Medicare and Medicaid
Most hospitals in Virginia participate in Medicare and Medicaid
programs 9 which require compliance with written standards. The
there shall be written policies and procedures specifying the scope and conduct of
patient care to be rendered in the emergency department/service. Such policies and
procedures must be approved by the medical staff and hospital administration, and
shall be reviewed at least annually, revised as necessary, dated to indicate the time of
the last review, and enforced.
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, -, 349 A.2d
245, 254 (1975); JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at ix.
26. JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at xxi-xxiv.
27. Medicare pays about 40% of all hospital bills. Haney, For Profit Hospitals Making
Their Mark, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 1984, at C3, col. 2.
28. Oulton, Reducing Risk Through Compliance with Accreditation Standards, QuALrry
REV. BULL., May 1980, at 1, 3 (discussing the experience of the Virginia Hospital Insurance
Reciprocal program with hospital liability resulting from "deficiencies in the quality of
health care"). The JCAH is regarded as a major ally in risk management because compli-
ance with the JCAH standards is believed to have a positive impact on the quality of care.
This, in turn, may decrease the likelihood of patient injury due to negligence. Id. at 3. As a
result of these findings and as an incentive to comply with JCAH, hospitals that are insured
by the Reciprocal may obtain the lowest premiums by compliance in four areas: quality
assurance, anesthesia services, critical care equipment, and credentialing staff and delineat-
ing staff privileges. Id.
29. All 108 general hospitals in Virginia meet the conditions for and participate in the
Medicare/Medicaid programs. Monthly Report, supra note 21.
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Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare)30 has provided,
since its inception, that the Department of Health and Human
Services set requirements applicable to the health and safety of
patients in participating hospitals. Hospitals accredited by JCAH
are deemed to comply with the conditions for participation so long
as they also meet the requirements for state licensing.3 1
The Medicaid program,32 initiated by the federal government
and adopted by Virginia in 1966, provides assistance to the medi-
cally needy and reimburses hospitals for patient care costs.3 3 JCAH
accredited hospitals, as under Medicare, are deemed to be in com-
pliance for purposes of reimbursement by the federal govern-
ment.3 4 A JCAH accredited hospital can receive reimbursement
under either program by completing a one-page federal form stat-
ing that it has complied with JCAH standards.35 In order to receive
Medicaid payments in Virginia, a hospital must additionally com-
plete a state form36 certifying that it is licensed by the state and is
either certified for Medicare participation or is accredited by
JCAH and has a utilization review program meeting Title XVIII of
the Social Security Act (Medicare) standards. 7
State licensing, together with JCAH accreditation, is a very sim-
ple and desirable method for hospitals to meet federal require-
ments for monetary assistance. If a hospital is not accredited by
JCAH, or if it loses its accreditation, 8 a hospital may instead meet
federal requirements for participation in Medicare or Medicaid by
30. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e)(8), 79 Stat. 286, 315 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1395 (1982)).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1101 (1983). See generally Dornette, The Legal Impact of Voluntary
Standards in Civil Actions Against the Health Care Provider, in HOSPITAL LABILITY: LAW
AND TACTICS 302-07 (1980); S. E. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 11, § 3:4, at 123.
32. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 206, 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 (1982)).
33. COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DEP'T OF HEALTH, VIRGINIA MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
HOSPITAL MANUAL 35 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HOSPITAL MANUAL].
34. Commonwealth of Va., Dep't of Health, Health Care Financing Administration, Hos-
pital Request for Certification in the Medicare and/or Medicaid Program, HCFA-1514(10-
80).
35. Id.
36. Commonwealth of Va., Dep't of Health, Medical Assistance Program, Hospital Partic-
ipation Agreement, Form MAP 100-2/1/69.
37. HOSPITAL MANUAL, supra note 33, at 35.
38. Loss of accreditation status initiates an immediate response by surveyors designated
by state and federal agencies involving extensive on-site inspection of the facility and its
programs. Interview with Esten H. Shomo, Assistant Director of Medical and Nursing Facil-
ities Services, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Virginia (May 2, 1984).
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complying with specific requirements promulgated by the federal
government which closely track the JCAH standards." The federal
requirements on emergency care4 ° directly correspond to the JCAH
standards for emergency services applicable to our hypothetical
patient-plaintiff. Both standards require written policies and pro-
cedures whose enforcement is the responsibility of the medical
staff. This basic uniformity between the standards of "voluntary"
associations and federal government regulations, which have the
force of law, demonstrates the error of applying the terms "opti-
mal" or "optional" to JCAH standards. This is especially true
where, as in Virginia, a health care provider may avoid complying
with a government regulation by virtue of compliance with a vol-
untary association regulation.
Both sets of standards reflect the input of many qualified per-
sons. JCAH is composed of representatives possessing mature
judgment and experience in the business of patient care: the Amer-
ican College of Surgeons, American College of Physicians, Ameri-
can Hospital Association, and American Medical Association.4
39. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1020-.1040 (1983).
40. Condition of Participation-Emergency Service or Department, 42 C.F.R. § 405.1033
(1983) provides:
(a) Standard; organization and direction ....
(1) There are written policies which are enforced to control emergency room
procedures.
(2) The policies and procedures governing medical care provided in the emergency
service or department are established by and are a continuing responsibility of the
medical staff.
(emphasis added).
41. JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at ix-x. For another example of the fact that the
documents referred to in this article are the products of group efforts, see the American
College of Obstetrician's and Gynecologist's statement concerning the authorship and mean-
ing of their standards:
Although this revision has been prepared by the ACOG Committee on Professional
Standards, it represents the cumulation of opinions, attitudes, experience, and judg-
ments of the College. The recommendations of various ACOG committees, as well as
many of the ACOG policy statements, have been incorporated in this volume. Where
appropriate, references have been made to technical bulletins and other resources of
both the ACOG and NAACOG. The cooperation of the many individuals of special
competence who collaborated in the development of the Standards is recognized with
gratitude.
The standards presented here should be achievable in this era of modern medicine
and technology. They should not be considered absolute, but rather a summation of
some of the best opinions currently available. Subsequent Committees on Profes-
sional Standards will continue to monitor developments as they occur. These stan-
dards are intended as guidelines that should be adapted to varying situations, taking
into account the needs and resources peculiar to the type of practice, the institution,
and the locality. Variations and innovations that may improve the quality of care are
734
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The regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services
are compiled by a broad range of consultants. The presence of col-
lective input refutes the hearsay objection that these standards re-
present the opinion of one person who is not present to be cross-
examined and highlights the character of the standards as evidence
of custom.
B. State Standards
1. Medicaid
All states regulate hospitals directly through state imposed
Medicaid regulations, which exist concurrently with the Federal
Medicaid Conditions for Participation. 42 Virginia requires its par-
ticipating hospitals to be JCAH accredited or to be in compliance
with Medicare regulations.43 The Virginia legislature has specifi-
cally declared that it is "in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of the health and welfare of the residents of the Common-
wealth" that a medical assistance regulatory program be
established 44 allowing the Commonwealth to inspect and audit all
records where medical assistance is provided. Consequently, Vir-
ginia checks to see that the requirements for participation, such as
the promulgation and enforcement of the written policies and pro-
cedures for providing patient care are complied with by hospitals
accepting state money.
2. Licensing
Written standards for hospital patient care are also required by
states through their licensing function. Pursuant to statutory au-
thority,45 the rules and regulations of the Department of Health
provide that no hospital may operate in Virginia without a li-
cense.46 In addition, the rules and regulations exist for the purpose
of defining the minimum standards required for licensing of Vir-
encouraged.
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNE-
COLOGIC SERVICES Viii (1982).
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. HOSPITAL MANUAL, supra note 33, at 35.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-310 (Cur. Supp. 1984).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-123(1) (Repl. Vol. 1979).
46. COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DEP'T OF HEALTH, Div. OF MEDICAL CARE AND NURSING FACIL-
ITY SERVICES, THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE LICENSURE OF HOSPITALS IN VIRGINIA §
30.1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RULES AND REGULATIONS].
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ginia hospitals.4 7 Courts should take judicial notice of pertinent
statutes and regulations pertaining to licensing.4 8
The degree of licensing inspection imposed on a hospital and its
programs for patient care is reduced for those institutions which
are accredited by JCAH or certified to receive Medicare funds.49 If
a hospital is JCAH accredited and provides the state with a copy
of the most recent survey results, the hospital is deemed to be in
compliance with the rules and regulations.50 Assuming that a hos-
pital was not accredited or that the JCAH survey revealed defi-
ciencies of concern to the state, then the hospital would have to
comply with the state regulations." Virginia has authorized the
Board of Health to issue regulations which "shall be in substantial
conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, sanitation, con-
struction, and safety as established and recognized by medical and
health care professionals and by specialists in matters of public
health and safety. '52
3. Negligence per se
A hospital or an individual physician, nurse or other similar pro-
fessional may be negligent per se for violation of a statute or statu-
torily authorized administrative regulation relating to patient care
when such violation is the proximate cause of a patient's injury. A
Virginia statute requires that a physician must be on call at all
times at each licensed hospital which holds itself out as operating
an emergency room. 3 If a relationship between the failure to have
a physician on call and the patient's injury is established, then the
hospital would be negligent as a matter of law. 54
47. Id. at § 10.2; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B) (Rep. Vol. 1979).
48. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
49. RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 46, § 30.11.1.
50. Id. at Part II (providing the specific organization and operation requirements).
51. Part of the annual licensing process includes a determination of whether or not a
hospital has complied with written policies and procedures. Interview with William Wake-
field, Supervisor, Acute Care Services, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Virginia
(May 2, 1984).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(A) (Repl. Vol. 1979).
53. Id. § 32.1-127(C).
54. See, e.g., Stahlin v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 484 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1973) (a negligence
case involving a nurse practicing without a license in violation of the state Nursing Act);
Kapuchinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966) (a federal tort claims negli-
gence case involving a violation of a safety rule designed to promote the safety of hospital
patients); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). The Restatement sets forth how
the standard of conduct is determined:
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C. A Defendant's Own Rules
A hospital typically has corporate bylaws, medical staff bylaws,
and policy and procedure manuals for its various departments.
These rules may also be viewed as including JCAH standards when
the hospital adopts these standards as its own in order to obtain
accreditation status, state licensure, or Medicare/Medicaid reim-
bursement. When a hospital is required by state or federal law to
make and enforce rules, or when the hospital relies on its accredi-
tation status as evidence of compliance with legal standards, then a
hospital should be estopped from asserting voluntariness as a de-
fense to the admission of these standards. Since Darling, the
courts have had no difficulty in admitting the self-imposed stan-
dards of hospitals as evidence of the standard of care, and no court
has used the argument that such standards were voluntary or self-
imposed as a reason for exclusion.55
Even if such standards were assumed to be voluntary, they
should still be admissible as representing the duty or standard
which the hospital has assumed.56 Furthermore, specifically as-
sumed duties represented by patient care standards are generally
uniform throughout the hospital industry and, as such, are im-
posed on the industry as a whole.5 7 For example, virtually every
hospital's emergency service has rules about taking vital signs, re-
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be
(a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which so
provides, or
(b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative regula-
tion which does not so provide, or
(c) established by judicial decision, or
(d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge or the jury, if there is no such
enactment, regulation, or decision.
Comment i to this same section, provides:
i. Statutory duties. In so far as the standard to which an actor must conform to
avoid being negligent is fixed by a legislative enactment, the fact that the legislature
is defining what it regards as the standard conduct of a reasonable man is less obvi-
ous. But on analysis it is clear that such is the case. By prohibiting a particular act
for the purpose of protecting the interests of some person or class of persons as indi-
viduals, the legislative body declares its opinion that the risk involved therein is
unreasonable.
55. See Dornette, supra note 31, at 320 n.61. This principle was applied in Kapuschinsky
v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 748 (D.S.C. 1966) (a Federal Tort Claims negligence case
which involved a violation of the hospital's own rules. The court found that the rules im-
posed no higher standard than that which prevailed in the applicable community) (citing
Smith v. United States, 336 F.2d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1964)).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
57. Dornette, supra note 31, at 314 n.37.
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cording medications given, and transferring patients. The existence
of and requirement for conformity with such basic rules are facts
capable of proof notwithstanding the existence of differently
worded or more extensively developed rules in some hospitals.
Failure to comply with these basic rules would be a violation at
any hospital under any standard. Moreover, in negligence cases it
is usually these common rules which allegedly have been violated.
The standards of the various certifying specialty boards applica-
ble to physicians,58 such as the American College of Pediatrics,
American College of Surgeons, and American College of Pathology,
should be admissible as evidence of the recognized, customary
practice of such specialists.59 Such standards may qualify as the
58. For a complete list of the American Colleges and Boards certifying medical experts
see 2 AM. JUR. 2D TRIALS, Locating Medical Experts 357 (Supp. 1984).
59. See H.B. 6681, 1984 Va. Gen. Assem. which provides for the admission of such stan-
dards. This bill has been carried over and will be studied along with other pending bills by a
study commission appointed to review matters concerning medical malpractice in Virginia.
(H.J. Res. 20).
This Committee reviews the applicable standard of care and the desirability of using a
national standard of care at least in certain limited circumstances. The national standards
referred to in this article are indicative of the existence of a national standard of care, which
has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions including all those adjacent to Virginia. See
also MINUTES OF INITIAL MEETING, JOINT SUBcOMMITTEE STUDY OF VIRGINIA'S MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE LAWS H.J. Res. 20, June 5, 1984. For jurisdictions which provide for the qualifica-
tion of non-resident experts based on national standards (for specialists at least) include:
United States-McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Layton,
329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964); Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
with oral opinion, 556 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1977).
Alabama-Lane v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1982); Early v. Noblin, 380 So. 2d 272 (Ala.
1980).
Arkansas-Rickett v. Hayes, 256 Ark. 893, 511 S.W.2d 187 (1974).
Arizona-Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (1978); Pollard v. Goldsmith, 117
Ariz. 363, 572 P.2d 1201 (1977); Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972).
District of Columbia-Robbins v. Footer, 179 U.S. App. D.C. 389, 553 F.2d 123 (1977).
Georgia-Summerour v. Saint Joseph's Infirmary, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 187, 286 S.E.2d 508
(1981); Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965).
Iowa-Bryant v. Rankin, 332 F. Supp. 319, afl'd, 468 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying
Iowa law); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685,
140 N.W.2d 139 (1966); Barnes v. Bovenmyer, 255 Iowa 220, 122 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
Kansas-Chandler v. Neosho Memorial Hosp., 223 Kan. 1, 574 P.2d 136 (1977); Simpson
v. Davis, 219 Kan. 584, 549 P.2d 950 (1976); Avery v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing,
Inc., 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013 (1968).
Kentucky-Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970).
Louisiana-Pesantes v. United States, 621 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana
law); Samuels v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Louisiana law);
Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127 (La. App.), cert. denied, 404 So. 2d 277 (1981);
Babin v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 849 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 386 So.
2d 358 (La. 1980); Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 843 (La. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979); White v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct.
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standard of care applicable to a particular doctor if that physician
App.), cert. denied, 363 So. 2d 915 (La. 1978).
Maine-Roberts v. Tardiff, 417 A.2d 444 (Me. 1980); Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620 (Me.
1979); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974).
Maryland-Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245
(1975).
Massachusetts-McCarthy v. Boston City Hosp., 358 Mass. 639, 266 N.E.2d 292 (1971);
Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
Michigan-Francisco v. Parchment Medical Clinic, P.C., 407 Mich. 325, 285 N.W.2d 39
(1979); Naccarato v. Groub, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Gilmore v. O'Sullivan,
106 Mich. App. 35, 307 N.W.2d 695 (1981); Patelczyk v. Olson, 95 Mich. App. 281, 289
N.W.2d 910 (1980); McCullough v. Hutzel Hosp., 88 Mich. App. 235, 276 N.W.2d 569 (1979);
LeBlanc v. Lentini, 82 Mich. App. 5, 266 N.W.2d 643 (1978); Callahan v. William Beaumont
Hosp., 67 Mich. App. 306, 240 N.W.2d 781 (1976), affd on other grounds, 400 Mich. 177,
254 N.W.2d 31 (1977); Burton v. Smith, 34 Mich. App. 270, 191 N.W.2d 77 (1971).
Minnesota-Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970).
Missouri-Hart v. Steele, 416 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1967); Martin v. Barbour, 558 S.W.2d 200
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Nevada-Moon v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 140 (D. Nev. 1981) (applying Nevada law);
Orcutt v. Miller, 95 Nev. 408, 595 P.2d 1191 (1979).
New Jersey-Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952)
(applying New Jersey law); Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127, 244 A.2d 109 (1968); Carbone
v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Tramutola v. Bortone, 118 N.J. Super. 503,
288 A.2d 863 (1972), modified in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 63 N.J. 9, 304 A.2d
197 (1973); Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super. 148, 193 A.2d 255 (1963); Clark v. Wichman, 72
N.J. Super. 486, 179 A.2d 38 (1962).
New York-Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1977).
Ohio-Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976).
Oklahoma-Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 516 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1973).
Pennsylvania-McPhee v. Reichel, 461 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd in part, remanded in
part on other grounds, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 111
(1979); Harrigan v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Freed v. Priore, 247 Pa. Super. 418, 372 A.2d 895 (1977).
South Carolina-King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981).
Tennessee-McCay v. Mitchell, 463 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
Texas-Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 496 F.2d 878, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 845 (1974) (applying Texas law); Christian v. Jeter, 445 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
Utah-Farrow v. Health Serv. Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 1979); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d
814 (Utah 1978).
Washington-Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Morrison v.
McKillop, 17 Wash. App. 396, 563 P.2d 220 (1977).
West Virginia-Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967); Duling v.
Bluefield Sanitarium, 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965).
Wisconsin-Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973); Shier v. Freed-
man, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166, modified on other grounds, reh'g denied, 208 N.W.2d
328 (1973); Froh v. Milwaukee Medical Clinic, S.C., 85 Wis. 2d 308, 270 N.W.2d 83 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1978).
Jurisdictions which allow qualification of non-resident experts based on identical or simi-
lar standards include:
Alaska-Priest v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1978).
California-Evans v. Ohanesian, 39 Cal. App. 3d 121, 112 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1974).
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has adopted the rules in order to obtain certification. There are
several reasons for this conclusion. A specialist who voluntarily
agrees to become certified, increases his prestige, his clientele, and
his income by advertising that he is so specialized. The commit-
Delaware-Peters v. Gelb, 303 A.2d 685 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
Indiana-Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953).
Montanta-Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 564 P.2d 162 (1977).
Nebraska-Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 237 N.W.2d 845 (1976).
New Mexico-Patterson v. Van Wiel, 91 N.M. 100, 570 P.2d 931, cert. denied, 569 P.2d
413 (1977); Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffee, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1977).
North Carolina-Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hosp., Inc., 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d
196 (1974); Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973); Wiggins v. Piver, 276
N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970); Howard v. Piver, 53 N.C. App. 46, 279 S.E.2d 876 (1981).
Rhode Island-Schenck v. Roger Williams Gen. Hosp., 119 R.I. 510, 382 A.2d 514 (1977);
Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956).
Virginia-Sawyer v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Va. 1978) (applying Virginia
law); Ives v. Redford, 219 Va. 838, 252 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
60. The American College of Surgeons requires those who apply for fellowship status to
take the following pledge:
In making application for Fellowship in the American College of Surgeons, I agree
to abide by the Bylaws of the College, and by such rules and regulations as may be
enacted from time to time, and subscribe to the Fellowship pledge as follows:
FELLOWSHIP PLEDGE
Recognizing that the American College of Surgeons seeks to exemplify and develop
the highest traditions of our profession, I hereby pledge myself, as a condition of
Fellowship in the College, to live in strict accordance with all its principles and
regulations.
I pledge myself to pursue the practice of surgery with scientific honesty and to
place the welfare of my patients above all else; to advance constantly in knowledge;
and to render willing help to my colleagues, regard their professional interests, and
seek their counsel when in doubt as to my own judgment.
Upon my honor I hereby declare that I will not practice the division of fees, either
directly or indirectly. I further promise to make my fees commensurate with the ser-
vices rendered and with the patient's rights. Moreover, I promise to deal with each
patient as I would wish to be dealt with were I in his position.
Finally, I pledge myself to cooperate in advancing and extending the ideals and
principles of the American College of Surgeons.
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, STATEMENTS ON PRINCIPLES 2 (1981).
The American Board of Pediatrics describes its function relative to pediatricians across
the country in drafting the following competency evaluation document: "[t]o provide defini-
tions and examples of those abilities, which are expected of competent physicians, and to
show how these abilities relate to the tasks which pediatricians must accomplish in provid-
ing optimal health care to children." THE AMERICAN BOARD OF PEDIATRICS, INC., FOUNDATION
FOR EVALUATING THE COMPETENCY OF PEDIATRICIANS 71 (1983).
The Board also identifies the standard with which Board certified pediatricians are ex-
pected to comply:
Pediatricians are responsible for identifying, with accuracy, the nature of problems
that may cause ill health in children, for determining methods of resolving or alleviat-
ing the problems, for using their skills or those of others to carry out management
plans, and for assessing the continued effectiveness of management. They further ac-
cept the responsibility for maintaining an optimum level of patient care.
Id. at 2.
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ment to adhere to certain standards of practice is the specialist's
quid pro quo for these benefits.
Certification is the preferred qualification for positions held by
physicians6 and for medical services provided within hospitals.
Some hospitals, for example, require their laboratories to be ac-
credited. The American College of Pathology62 believes that pa-
thology services are "essential to patient care," and consequently
requires specific credentials for a laboratory director. Such stan-
dards could be relevant evidence in a case where a hospital is al-
leged to be negligent for the acts of its laboratory director. The
relevance exists if, in performing a procedure which caused injury
to a patient, it could be shown that the director would have known
the proper procedure if he had had the training necessary to obtain
the required credentials.
Apart from certification programs, many health care profession-
als voluntarily join other professional organizations which promul-
gate their own standards. Nurses, for example, may be members of
the American Nurses Association (ANA), Association of Operating
Room Nurses (AORN), and the Nurses Association of the Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, all of which gener-
ate codes or standards for practice.
IV. VIRGINIA CASES PERTINENT TO THE ADMISSION OF WRITTEN
STANDARDS
There is no case law in Virginia on the admissibility of medical
and hospital standards. The Virginia Supreme Court in Bly v.
Rhoads6 3 considered the lower court's failure to admit bylaws and
accreditation rules, but declined to rule on that issue. The court
noted that the need for expert testimony would not be altered by
the admission of the standards.64 Other Virginia decisions have
stated that bylaws and accreditation rules do not technically have
the force of law and, therefore, would only be some evidence of the
61. See the Rules and Regulations of one local Richmond, Virginia hospital's Department
of Obstetrics and Gynecology which require that all members of the division be either Board
certified by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or have completed a
residency program making them Board eligible. These same Rules and Regulations provide
that all consulting members of the division must be Board certified.
62. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PATHOLOGY, STANDARDS FOR LABORATORY ACCREDITATION (2d ed.
1982).
63. 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
64. Id. at 653, 222 S.E.2d at 789.
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standard of care rather than evidence sufficient in and of itself to
establish negligence or the absence of negligence. 5
The Bly court noted as relevant Virginia Railway and Power
Company v. Godsey s This street car passenger injury case should
be considered with the 1983 decision of Pullen v. Nickens,7 an
automobile accident case. Godsey held that in a personal injury
action a defendant's private rules cannot be introduced either by
the plaintiff to show conduct required, or by the defendant to
prove freedom from negligence. The opinion noted that if such ad-
missions were permitted, a person could, "by the adoption of pri-
vate rules, fix the standard of his duties to others," ' rather than
the law properly fixing the standard. The rules would also amount
to a party admission that reasonable care requires adherence to
"all the precautions therein prescribed. 6s9 The court noted that
the plaintiff did not know about the rules, and therefore was not
"influenced" by them. As a matter of policy, the court stated that
admitting the company rules would discourage a company from
having any rules at all or from setting a higher standard for itself
than that required by law.Y°
In following Godsey, Pullen cited the following as reasons for
prohibiting the admission of standards: (1) the plaintiff's ignorance
of the "guidelines," (2) the defendant's employees' lack of familiar-
ity with the guidelines, and (3) the fact that the action was based
on a violation of law rather than a violation of rules, which rules
were in fact inapplicable to the work being performed by the de-
fendant's employees just prior to the injury.7 Based on the preced-
ing analysis, the Godsey and Pullen decisions are distinguishable,
and patient care standards can be admitted into evidence without
necessitating a reversal of the positions adopted by the court.
Patient care standards which do not have the force of law do not
ultimately define the defendant's duty. That duty is always what is
reasonable under all the circumstances unless the law, by creating
a statutory standard, has predetermined what is reasonable. The
65. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Rayburn, 213 Va. 812, 195 S.E.2d 860 (1973). Cf. Mackey v. Miller,
221 Va. 715, 273 S.E.2d 550 (1981) (airplane crash case in which court declined to decide
whether violation of F.A.A. regulations was neglience per se).
66. 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915). See also Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 16, 68 n.17 (1956).
67. 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983).
68. 117 Va. at 168, 83 S.E. at 1073.
69. Id. at 169, 83 S.E. at 1073.
70. Id. at 169-70, 83 S.E. at 1073.
71. 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983).
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standards, along with learned treatises and expert witnesses, sim-
ply represent some concrete evidence of that duty and assist the
trier of fact in determining the relevant standard of care. Health
care standards are neither private nor voluntarily adopted regard-
less of whether an individual patient-plaintiff is specifically aware
of them. Invariably, a defendant hospital's employees admit under
oath that knowledge of relevant standards and substantial compli-
ance with them is a basic part of their orientation training and a
required part of their job descriptions.72 Physicians sign agree-
ments to abide by the Hospital Bylaws and Medical Staff rules and
regulations in order to obtain staff privileges."' Patients are indeed
"influenced" by the fact that a hospital is licensed or accredited
and patients generally know that something is required in order to
obtain such a certificate even if the specifics are not known. Pa-
tients are also parties to these standards as members of the public,
represented by government agencies which require and enforce
health care standards for "the public welfare. '7 4
The incentive to promulgate hospital department rules will not
disappear when courts allow the admission of standards as evi-
dence. Hospitals are required by state and federal law to promul-
gate such rules, and compliance with these laws is ultimately asso-
ciated with a hospital's financial success. If a hospital adopts a
higher standard than that required by law, then the test of negli-
gence will be that which the reasonably prudent hospital would
employ in like circumstances. In some situations, a high standard
of care may be required of all health care providers if custom in
the industry75 and reasonableness so dictate. In other less well de-
fined situations, the standard may be lower or more variable. Nev-
ertheless, the point is that health care providers are now regulated,
and the regulations include standards adopted for the benefit of
the public. For the courts to prohibit the introduction of these
standards in medical negligence actions would derogate the rights
72. See, e.g., the internal rules of a typical hospital located in Richmond, Virginia. The
rules state that every member of the nursing department staff shall be expected to know
and be aware of the polices and procedures that apply to the area in which he or she works.
73. See JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 93.
74. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
75. See C & M Promotions v. Ryland, 208 Va. 158, 164 S.E.2d 132 (1967). See generally
Young v. Merritt, 182 Va. 605, 29 S.E.2d 834 (1944) (action for unlawful arrest and false
imprisonment in which the court took judicial notice that a large majority of servicemen are
highly moral); Branch v. Burnley, 5 Va. (1 Call) 147 (1797) (action involving the collection
of a debt by an attorney in which the court took judicial notice of the general practice of
attorneys in collecting debts for their clients).
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of patients, ignore advances in health technology, and contradict
the legislative mandates of this particular industry and its in-
tended beneficiaries.
Several Virginia cases outside the medical and hospital negli-
gence areas of law illustrate how written policies and rules are used
as evidence. The denial of unemployment compensation benefits
was affirmed based partly on the employee's failure to comply with
the company policy against garnishment resulting in his dismis-
sal.76 Federal Employees' Liability Act (FELA) claims of injured
railroad employees have been decided in part on evidence of the
employer's safety rules which were properly introduced by both
plaintiffs and defendants.77 Safety policies adopted by a defendant
and used as a basis for its instructions to its employees have been
held to be admissible evidence of the defendant's knowledge of po-
tential danger.78 Furthermore, it has been held to be reversible er-
ror to exclude written material showing that the defendant should
have done what it failed to do even though a defendant was willing
to stipulate that it failed to do the act in question.79 The rule is
generally "that a litigant is entitled to introduce all competent,
material and relevant evidence which tends to prove or disprove
any material issue raised. Defendant's alleged negligence was a ma-
terial issue and the exclusion of the [instructions] was error."80
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already indicated its
willingness to consider such standards as evidence of the applica-
ble standard of care in medical negligence cases. In Pelphrey v.
United States,"' the court affirmed an Eastern District of Virginia
76. Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 245 S.E.2d 180 (1978); see also,
Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. v. Jenkins, 207 Va. 399, 150 S.E.2d 120 (1966).
77. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Ward, 214 Va. 543, 202 S.E.2d 877 (1974); Norfolk S. Ry.
v. Rayburg, 213 Va. 812, 195 S.E.2d 860 (1973).
78. New Bay Shore Corp. v. Lewis, 193 Va. 400, 69 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
79. Barnette v. Dickens, 205 Va. 12, 135 S.E.2d 109 (1964).
80. Id. at 15, 135 S.E.2d at 112 (emphasis added) (citing Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611,
620, 79 S.E.2d 652, 657 (1954)).
81. 674 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Graves v. Gulmatico, No. CA 83-0679-R (E.D.
Va. Sept. 4, 1984) (Judge D. Dortch Warriner ruled that the HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL STAFF
BYLAWS were not only admissible exhibits in a case against a physician, but represented
some of the best evidence of the applicable standard of care). Contra, Graves v. Commu-
nity Memorial Hosp., No. 1721 (Cir. Ct. of Mecklenburg County Mar. 9, 1984) (Judge
Charles L. McCormick ruled that the EMERGENCY ROOM MANUAL was not admissible against
the hospital); Layne v. Christie, No. LG-1725 (Richmond Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 1984) (Judge Wil-
liam E. Spain ruled that the MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS and AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
BYLAWS were not admissible against a physician. Ruling was based on the unpublished hold-
ing in Strayer v. Halterman, No. 82-1673 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1983), finding no error in the
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opinion granting summary judgment to the defendant in a Federal
Torts Claims Act hospital negligence action. In its opinion, the
court noted that the defendant's affidavits showed that the recruit-
ment of physicians was "in accord with specific statutory and regu-
latory standards"; the doctor's qualification exceeded the "mini-
mum standard"; and that the hospital was "fully accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. '82 In summariz-
ing this evidence, the court held that the affidavits were not "opin-
ion," and stated "we are at a loss to say what other informed
sources the government could have called upon to demonstrate
that it had met its duty of care in physician selection and hospital
administration. 8
3
V. PROCEDURAL STEPS LEADING TO THE ADMISSION OF STANDARDS
AND THEIR CONSIDERATION BY JURIES
In pretrial discovery, a plaintiff in a medical negligence case
needs to request production of all written rules which may pertain
to the allegations of negligence. Furthermore, the plaintiff should
submit interrogatories, requesting all information concerning the
defendant's licenses, accreditations, certifications, and eligibility
for Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement at the time of the plaintiff's
injury. Once obtained, the information should be recast in the form
of requests for admission so as to avoid authenticity or timeliness
objections at trial. Likewise, defendants should review the same in-
formation and request admissions if appropriate. All applicable in-
formation gathered should be provided to a party's experts.
During depositions, factual witnesses who provide care or who
are administratively or vicariously responsible for patient care
should be questioned. Their familiarity with written standards
should be discerned, as well as their knowledge as to whether com-
exclusion of an emergency room manual. However, note that such unpublished opinions are
of questionable precedential value. FED. R. APP. P. 18 (4th Cir.)).
82. Pelphrey, 674 F.2d at 247.
83. Id. See also Just, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Reg-
ulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REv. 835, 914 n.559 (1983). The
section entitled of Inadequate Standards and Inspections through Tort Law," cites addi-
tional cases where the defendants' verdicts were supported in part by evidence of compli-
ance with written standards of care. See, e.g., Moreaux v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 240,
246 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 776 (La. 1977) (wrongful death medical malprac-
tice action wherein compliance with requirements of JCAH Standards as reflected in re-
peated JCAH inspections was evidence in support of the verdict in favor of the defendant
hospital).
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pliance is an employment criteria, an institution requirement, or a
certification, accreditation, licensing or reimbursement require-
ment. Expert witnesses should also be asked whether the stan-
dards applicable to a particular institution are the same or similar
to those of other institutions with which the expert is familiar,
whether compliance is generally required, and whether their opin-
ion regarding negligence is based in part on conformity to or devia-
tion from such standards.
A. Documentary Evidence
Either party may request that written standards be directly ad-
mitted by judicial notice, 4 stipulation, or introduction through a
proper person who can authenticate a standard and its applicabil-
ity to the health care provider. Such appropriate persons include
hospital administrators, chiefs of medical staffs, directors of nurs-
ing, and representatives of state licensing agencies and federal re-
imbursement programs. Alternatively, written standards may be
introduced through requests for admissions once their genuineness
and timeliness have been admitted. A less desirable method of in-
troducing the information contained in the standards is through
the use of interrogatories and answers, or requests for admission
and answers, pertaining to the standards themselves.
It is best for the party seeking the admission of standards to
introduce the standards or portions of them as early as possible in
the trial, and refer to them in the examination of as many wit-
nesses as appropriate so as to enhance their significance and in-
crease the chances that they will be remembered for the duration
of the medical or hospital negligence trial. If the standard's rele-
vance to the facts in issue is questioned after the standard is au-
thenticated, then there are several alternatives. First, the attorney
can offer to explain, either verbally or in a trial brief, the relevancy
of the standard. Secondly, the document can later be introduced
through a witness who is familiar with its specific relevance to the
facts in issue. Such witnesses include factual witnesses who are
health care providers and who use the standards themselves 5 or
expert medical witnesses who use the same or similar standards,
84. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-386 to -388 (Repl. Vol. 1984); C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN VIRGINIA §§ 275, 282 (2d ed. 1983); see also cases cited supra note 75.
85. See C. Friend, supra note 84, § 253 (stating that if a hospital takes a position at trial
contrary to that which is stated in one of its own rules and which is both material and
relevant, the rule may be admissible alternatively as a party admission).
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and have reviewed the document containing the standard in con-
junction with giving an expert opinion.86
B. Testimonial Evidence
Witnesses may read to the jury portions of documents as part of
their testimony on direct or cross examination. Based on the rela-
tive effectiveness of demonstrative as compared with spoken evi-
dence, this method is probably less effective than introducing
materials which the jury can see. Therefore, it is preferable that
the attorney attempt to introduce the standard as an exhibit, and
only have the contents read if the judge refuses admission. If testi-
mony comes in first, the standards themselves may be viewed as
cumulative evidence. Cases have held that the exclusion of stan-
dards is not reversible error when experts had already testified to
the information contained therein. 87 If a standard must be read,
then a blowup of the pertinent material can still be used as a de-
monstrative aid during closing argument to focus the jury's atten-
tion on the standard.
C. The Court's Discretion
Although the standards are found to be authentic and relevant,
they will still be subject to the discretionary power of the court.
Judges may allow a party to exclude nonrelevant parts with preju-
dicial impact or include additional parts or material which serve to
explain or qualify a standard.88 The scope of discretion regarding
admission was explained by the McComish court in 1964.
Whether the entire code [standard] or just the pertinent portion
should go to the jury (removed from the document, or copies or pho-
tostated), or whether the pertinent portion should simply be read to
the jury, must remain in [the judge's] hands, and an appellate tribu-
nal will not interfere unless abuse of discretion is manifest.8 9
While there may be no apparent reason to exclude the standards,
attorneys trying cases where standards are applicable should first
determine the most effective manner of admission, and then be
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
87. Cornfeldt v. Tonsen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 704 (Minn. 1977).
88. McComish v. Desui, 42 N.J. 274, -, 200 A.2d 116, 123 (1964).
89. 42 N.J. at -, 200 A.2d at 122.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
prepared to utilize alternatives.
D. Jury Instructions
Once the standards have been admitted into evidence, the attor-
ney who sought their admission should make certain that the
meaning of that evidence is clearly made to the jury to in order
avoid inadvertent misconceptions. The following sample instruc-
tion is recommended for that purpose:
In determining the nature of any duty owed the plaintiff by the de-
fendant, you should take into consideration the provisions of the ev-
idence in this case on the subject of the rules and regulations of the
[Licensing Act of Virginia; Joint Commission on the Accreditation
of Hospitals; Policies and Procedures of Any Department of Any
Hospital; By-laws of Any Hospital; By-laws of the Medical Staff of
Any Hospital; Federal Medicare and Medicaid Regulations, Stan-
dards of the American College of ] and weigh
these provisions along with all the other evidence in the case in de-
termining that duties were imposed upon the defendant."0
VI. CONCLUSION
Virginia courts should allow written standards pertaining to pa-
tient care proffered by plaintiffs and defendants to be admitted as
evidence provided that those standards are properly authenticated
and relevant to the specific allegations of negligence at issue. Such
standards would assist the trier of fact in its determination of the
standard of care in a given situation. Written standards, especially
those which predate a lawsuit, are more reliable in many respects
than are the divergent opinions of experts employed by the oppos-
ing parties. These standards are composed and approved by health
care providers with varied educations and practices who are collec-
tively familiar with the pertinent health care literature. Because
these standards represent the combined wisdom of many, this con-
sensus opinion becomes evidence of industry custom and is not ob-
jectionable hearsay.
Those standards written pursuant to state licensing and Medi-
care and Medicaid requirements exist to benefit public safety and
90. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, -, 200
N.E.2d 149, 189 (1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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welfare, and therefore are not objectionable on the grounds that
they are private or voluntary. Decisions of other jurisdictions are
examples of proper factual situations and procedures for the ad-
mission of written standards on behalf of both plaintiffs and defen-
dants. There are significant Virginia cases where non-medical writ-
ten standards were permissibly introduced at trial in civil litigation
by plaintiff as evidence of defendant's negligence, duty and knowl-
edge of danger. The previous Virginia Supreme Court decisions,
which prohibited the admission of standards, Virginia Railway
and Power v. Godsey and Pullen v. Nickens are clearly distin-
guishable since neither case involved health care providers, nor pa-
tient care standards, nor the present realities of essentially uni-
form standards in the health care industry. There exist no policy
reasons for excluding the standards.
The standard to be applied in a given case will still be that of
reasonable care under all the circumstances unless, reasonableness
has already been defined by statute or a related regulation. Admis-
sion of these reliable documents as an aid to the trier of fact would
increase the likelihood of just and informed decisions in the devel-
oping and complicated area of medical and hospital negligence, as
well as remove some of the elusiveness surrounding the standard of
care.
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